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Brazil has been labeled an anchor country, a leading area, and a 
regional power. Yet, even before the crisis triggered by Operation ‘Car 
Wash’ began, several scholars had called into question Brazil’s driving 
role in regional integration, stressing political challenges and 
economic weaknesses that hindered closer relationships among 
the South American countries. More optimistic research tends to 
concentrate on initiatives and visions of Brazil’s regional leadership, 
with lesser focus on obstacles and implementation. We develop the 
concept of ‘geoeconomic nodality’ to assess Brazi’s impact on South 
America and shed light on the structural sources of economic 
fragmentation, namely geographical conditions and their interaction 
with public policies. A geoeconomic node is the core of economic 
networks in a geographically delimited system. The flows of  
the system ’s units are focused on the node, enabling it to 
transfer impulses for development – and reflecting what the concepts 
on anchor countries, leading areas, and regional powers suggest. Our 
findings show that long distances, physical barriers, the maritime 
orientation of core zones of population and economic activity, 
and the poor state of transcontinental infrastructure reduce Brazil’s 
geoeconomic nodality. Resource nationalism, volatile public 
policies, and fluctuating exchange rates contribute to this structural mix, 
so that the prospects to overcome the obstacles imposed by geography 
appear dim. 
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he World Bank (2009) suggests that developing countries attach 
themselves to nearby emerging economies – ‘leading areas’ in its 
terminology – so as to benefit from momentum for development. The concept of 
‘anchor countries’ has been coined to identify these emerging economies – for 
example Brazil, India, and South Africa – as regional growth engines (STAMM, 
2004). Nolte (2010) argues that ‘regional powers’ shape regions of 
(sub)continental scope. States so defined are economic cores tied to their regional 
peripheries through production and trade, both dominating their neighboring 
countries but also fostering their development (KAPPEL, 2012). 
Despite their minor differences, these concepts are based on the assumption 
that some countries are decisive for the economic prospects of entire 
(sub)continents. Such an assumption has been widely applied to Brazil’s role in 
South America. This country, the argument goes, has become capable 
of “contributing to the development of others, mainly in its own region” (RAMANZINI 
JR. and MARIANO, 2018, p. 235, our translation). Pinheiro and Gaio (2014) 
suggest that Brazil has acted as regional leader because of its commitment to 
development in South America. Lima and Hirst argue that under President Lula da 
Silva, Brazil “laid great emphasis on the expansion of business relations” (LIMA 
and HIRST, 2006, pp. 30-31) with its neighboring countries – seeking to promote a 
developmentalist agenda for the region. During the Lula era, Brazil tried “to bridge 
political and ideological cleavages by guiding the states of the region towards  
the shared goal of a South American space” (FLEMES, 2010, p. 109), taking the lead 
in collaboration on economic and security issues. 
However, these scholars provide little evidence that the rhetoric on 
regional cooperation and integration is matched by a concrete economic impact. 
Their research generates important insights on agency, but it mostly neglects 
structure, particularly regarding connectivity among the South American 
countries. At first glance, it seems that Brazil is a typical leading area, 
anchor country, and regional power: it is the top trading partner of Argentina, 
Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay (Figures 01 and 02); it has been the leading 
promoter of the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of 
South America (IIRSA); and its National Development Bank (BNDES) has 
T 
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supported the internationalization of Brazilian firms throughout the region. 
Brazil’s political ambitions reach beyond the Southern Cone, as exemplified by 
its role in the establishment of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 
2008. 
Yet, some scholars have voiced skepticism regarding Brazil’s influence and 
impact on South America (BURGES, 2005; DOCTOR, 2013; MALAMUD, 2011, 2005; 
MALAMUD and GARDINI, 2012; SPEKTOR, 2010). We contribute to this debate by 
offering a perspective from political geography. This allows us to assess de facto 
interaction (instead of mere declarations and initiatives). It also sheds light on a 
usually overlooked factor: the impact of geographical conditions upon the 
relationships between Brazil and its neighboring countries, especially regarding 
what we call ‘geoeconomic nodality’. 
A geoeconomic node is the core of economic networks in a geographically 
delimited system. The flows of all units that are part of the system are focused on 
the node, enabling it to transfer momentum for development. Geoeconomic 
nodality is a sine-qua-non condition for anchor countries, leading areas, and 
regional powers to exist at all, and for regional integration to progress. 
The concept of geoeconomic nodality leads to an assessment of structure, 
not agency. We are not saying that studies that deal with agency – revealing, for 
example, how different interest groups shape Brazil’s approach toward the region 
(CASON and POWER, 2009) or how Brazil strategically defects from leading 
integration (KRAPOHL, 2019) – are without merit. On the contrary, we 
acknowledge that agency influences some geographical conditions in the long run. 
It is important for public policies, which our analysis covers too. However, an 
analysis of geoeconomic nodality should shed light on aspects neglected by 
mainstream research, thus complementing the state of the art. 
The time-sensitive data of our analysis concentrates on the period from 
2008 to 2017, which arguably displays the arc of Brazil ’s regional influence 
from zenith to nadir. By chance – or not – it also coincides with the life span of 
UNASUR, from its foundation to its abandonment by most member states. 
This article consists of five sections. First, we summarize the literature on 
emerging economies and regional development, with particular regard to Brazil, 
and introduce the defining features of geoeconomic nodality. Second, we examine 
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regional patterns of trade and investment so as to capture Brazil’s nodality. Third, 
we analyze the impact of location and physical barriers on the relations between 
Brazil and the rest of South America. Fourth, we assess the state of the 
region’s infrastructure for energy and transport. Fifth, we explain how public 




The term anchor country encompasses emerging economies that 
play a central role in the development of regions of (sub)continental scale. The 
criterion that determines whether a state is an anchor country is its share of 
the regional economic output. Anchor countries are supposed  to be 
economically more diversified and to possess a share of industrial production 
above the average of the Global South. As a consequence, they are more 
competitive than other developing countries and serve as regional growth 
engines: prosperity in anchor countries is expected to lead to regional prosperity; 
recession in anchor countries to regional recession (STAMM, 2004). 
The World Bank (2009) has advanced a similar understanding in its 
World Development Report. It labels countries that are economically more 
developed than their surroundings as leading areas – Brazil and South Africa, for 
example. The key argument is that leading areas offer a high density of economic 
activity, and developing countries have to reduce distance and division vis-à-
vis leading areas so as to benefit from this density.  Spatial disparities will 
eventually decrease due to economic impulses generated by leading areas. Remote 
areas cannot be successful in isolation: their development requires links to 
the greater national and (sub)continental economy. 
Research on regional powers starts with the idea that these states are 
influential (ØSTERUD, 1992). To qualify as a regional power, a state must be 
closely linked to its region in cultural, economic, and political ways (NOLTE, 2010). 
Hence, regional connectivity, which is a mere assumption in the anchor-country 
concept, becomes a condition for regional powers. Sometimes, this defining feature 
has been reduced to a criterion “for distinguishing and classifying different types of 
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regional powers” (FLEMES and NOLTE, 2010, p. 07). Yet, if a regional power is not 
closely linked to its neighbors, why should one expect it to have an impact on 
them? 
We show that regional connectivity is one of Brazil’s key shortcomings. 
Brazil does not serve as a geoeconomic node of South America because it hardly 
connects with many of its neighboring countries. Research on the political 
economy of regional powers stresses the relevance of such connectivity. 
Kappel (2012) argues that regional powers achieve dominance over other states 
through unbalanced trade relations, the provision of capital, goods, and 
services. Regional powers are industrial cores. Sophisticated production is 
concentrated there, whereas more basic and standardized production is relocated 
to the regional peripheries. Regional powers are thus tied to their spheres of 
influence in value chains that allow for regionally dispersed and integrated 
production. 
So how do the three concepts – anchor countries, leading areas, and 
regional powers – apply to Brazil? Basic trade data, IIRSA, and political 
commitment suggest that Brazil has played an important role in South America. 
The country accounts for about 50 percent of the regional economic output. 
Others – mainly Argentina in the automotive sector – are bound to the Brazilian 
economy in value chains. Their prosperity depends on Brazil’s. The mid-2000s 
were marked by considerable efforts toward institution building within the 
Common Market of the South (Mercosur), especially to allow for developmental 
cooperation (RAMANZINI JR. and MARIANO, 2018; RIGGIROZZI and TUSSIE, 2012). 
Saraiva (2010) argues that economic and political integration in South America has 
been critical to Brazil for decades, as it guarantees foreign political autonomy vis-
à-vis the United States and creates a fundament for Brazil ’s global 
aspirations. At least prior to the end of Dilma Rousseff’s presidency, Brazil did 
indeed pursue a proactive regional agenda, as summarized by Lima (2014). 
Against the backdrop of these developments, Milani, Pinheiro and Lima 
(2017) advance the concept of ‘graduation’, arguing that the rise of states such as 
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Brazil comes along with a shift from an orientation to the Global North to deeper 
regional integration that follows a long-term vision1. 
We contend that the features above are insufficient to ascribe an 
outstanding relevance to Brazil as the three aforementioned concepts do. Much 
research on Brazil’s role in South America is limited to declarations on interstate 
cooperation and integration initiatives. An analysis of whether such rhetoric 
translates into reality is often lacking. This shortcoming is exemplified by Palestini 
and Agostinis (2015), who claim that the South American states have successfully 
cooperated on transport infrastructure, but they fall short of showing impacts on 
regionalization. They mostly summarize how much has been spent on how many 
projects within the portfolio of UNASUR’s Council on Infrastructure and Planning 
(COSIPLAN) that subsumed IIRSA in 2011. 
Admittedly, a considerable number of projects have been implemented. 
This does not say much about effective integration, however. None of 
COSIPLAN/IIRSA’s axes, which crisscross South America and frame the 
individual projects, is a neatly integrated corridor comparable to the First 
Transcontinental Railroad in the US or Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railroad. Each axis 
consists of local projects: the bituminization of a road along a few dozen 
kilometers, the construction of a regional airport or the upgrading of a border 
post. Eighty-three percent of IIRSA’s projects are single-country projects. 
Bilateral projects reach 16 percent, and only one percent is multilateral 
(COSIPLAN, 2017). The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB, 2008) concludes 
that the dominance of single-country projects has kept IIRSA from fulfilling its 
mandate to foster regional integration. 
Against the backdrop of regional cooperation being more rhetoric than 
reality, regional integration had come to a dead end even before Brazil’s present 
economic and political crisis began2. Burges (2005) refers to the low level of 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1Milani, Pinheiro and Lima (2017) also refer to the global scale, where graduated powers become 
rule makers. We limit our analysis to the regional level. 
2Here and further below, we refer to the sharp decline of Brazil ’s GDP growth rate, with 
the economy contracting in 2015 and 2016. The related political crisis brought about the 
impeachment of President Rousseff, the interim Temer presidency, and the tense 2018 election, 
which led to the controversial Bolsonaro presidency. 
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intraregional trade and argues that South America lacks a business sector like the 
European one that could be the driver of deeper integration. Taking up Mattli’s 
idea that regional integration depends on leading powers that not only coordinate 
policies but also “ease distributional tension by acting as […] ‘paymasters’” 
(MATTLI, 1999, p. 04), Malamud (2011, 2005) highlights that Brazil does 
not contribute disproportionately to regional integration. Doctor (2013) shows 
that economic asymmetries and institutional deficits hamper deepening 
integration in Mercosur. Malamud and Gardini (2012) suggest that regionalism has 
peaked and delivers diminishing returns. Spektor (2010) argues that already 
during the proactive Lula era, Brazil preferred regional cooperation to remain 
fragile and minimalist. 
These problems have been reinforced by the more recent economic 
downturn and political instability. Suffering from severe budget constraints, Brazil 
could hardly make the necessary financial contribution to regional integration 
today, regardless of the fact that doing so is not on the agenda of President Jair 
Bolsonaro, who appears to have little interest in Mercosur – except for its role as 
an instrument for a trade agreement with the European Union.   
All of the above are economic and political challenges to Brazil’s role as an 
anchor country, leading area, and regional power. Debates on Brazil’s role in South 
America would also benefit from recognizing the relevance of geography – 
especially because an analysis of geographical constraints highlights the 
tremendous gap between the rhetoric and reality of regional integration and 
development (MALAMUD, 2018). Geographical factors interact with public policies 
(both being conditions or independent variables) to determine the economic 
impact of Brazil on the region (which is the outcome or dependent variable). In 
order to uncover this causal relationship, this article focuses on Brazil’s prospects 
as a geoeconomic node. 
Among the publications we have reviewed, only Viola and Lima (2017) 
mention geographical conditions. They point out that physical barriers such as 
the Andes and poor transport infrastructure obstruct regional value chains in 
South America, whereas the ease of maritime transport favors them in Southeast 
Asia. Unfortunately, the two authors do not go into details. As a side note, the 
gravity model – widely used by economists who study regional integration such as 
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Bown et al. (2017) and Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) – is based on distance as an 
independent variable. According to this model, the intensity of bilateral 
trade is expected to correspond to the size of the gross domestic product of the 
countries in consideration and distance between them. However, such research 
often applies a simplistic understanding of distance, measuring it in Euclidean 
terms – how many kilometers country A and B are apart. We conceptualize 
distance in a more complex and thus more realistic way. For example, Colombia is 
not economically close to Brazil, although they share a common border. Euclidean 
distance between Brasília and La Paz may be relatively low, but the two cities are 
further apart than, for instance, Seoul and Singapore are. 
Our analytical framework derives from the lifework of the political 
geographer Saul Cohen. Cohen’s (1963) analyses begin with an investigation of 
location and physical barriers. For instance, he points out that after the Adams–
Onís Treaty signed by Spain and the US in 1819, Florida remained a peripheral 
part of the US for several decades, marked by swamps hindering any kind of 
development. The peninsula blocked rather than enabled the US expansion into the 
Caribbean. Cohen (1963) also examines core areas of population and economic 
activity as well as the connections between them, contextualizing these 
phenomena with regard to location and physical barriers: Florida turned into a 
stepping stone for the US into the Caribbean when infrastructure was built there 
and population density increased. 
In this sense, Cohen’s research revolves around “the interaction 
between, on the one hand, geographical settings […] and, on the other, 
political processes” (2009, p. 12). He sees the “differentiated political space” 
as a result of the interplay “between the physical and the cultural [meaning 
man-made] environment” (COHEN, 1957, p. 05). Further to that, Florida ’s 
role in the US expansion into the Caribbean exemplifies that political 
space is “shaped by two forces – the centrifugal and the centripetal” (COHEN, 
2009, p. 34), with the former driving separation between territories and the latter 
promoting territorial unity. Centrifugal and centripetal forces comprise both 
naturally given and man-made geography. In other words, states shape their own 
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material surroundings to a certain extent – for instance by building infrastructure 
to overcome physical barriers. 
Cohen’s position holds geography as a holistic science that covers all 
factors that matter, including many that political scientists associate with 
constructivist and institutionalist theories of international relations. Ours, 
meanwhile, is an approach that narrows the analytical scope down to material 
conditions that exist in geographic space. Rephrasing the conditions central to 
Cohen, our analysis focuses on four determinants of geoeconomic nodality: 01. 
location, distance, and physical barriers, as fundamental factors that provide a 
first indication of the extent to which a region can be tied to a geoeconomic 
node; 02. the distribution of the population and economic activity, which 
impinges on the cohesion of a region and thus on geoeconomic nodality; 
03. infrastructure for energy and transport, which constitutes the key man-
made, centripetal force that helps to overcome distance and physical 
barriers; and 04. public policies, which condition the impact of the 
aforementioned determinants by boosting or hampering geoeconomic nodality. 
Brazil’s prospects as a geoeconomic node are also influenced by 
economics, most importantly foreign trade structures. The South American 
countries are mainly exporters of raw materials. Europe, the Far East, 
and North America – but not South America – are attractive markets for 
them (SCHOLVIN and MALAMUD, 2014). Brazil’s economy has seen a revival 
of the primary sector because of increasing exports of commodities to China 
(JENKIS, 2012). Nevertheless, Brazil’s industrial and services sectors grew 
until the current crisis. Its economy is diversified, providing opportunities 
for intraregional trade. Realizing such opportunities depends on overcoming 
geographical obstacles and adequate public policies being in place.  
 
Brazil’s geoeconomic nodality 
Economic ties 
A pre-crisis survey of Brazil’s largest transnational companies revealed 
that each of the most internationalized among them – for instance Banco do Brasil, 
Odebrecht, and Vale – were present in five to eight South American countries. 
These enterprises were (and still are) also active in numerous Asian, European 
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and, to a lesser extent, African countries. Moderately internationalized, 
large companies appear to focus on South America: eight of the thirteen 
foreign countries where Petrobras operated in 2011 were South 
American; even eight out of nine in the case of the construction company Tigre. If 
one counts the mere physical presence abroad, and thus disregards the  
profitability and volume of business activities, South America accounted for 31 
percent of the foreign activities of Brazil’s largest companies prior to the crisis – 
significantly more than Europe (21 percent) and Asia (17 percent) (FUNDAÇÃO 
DOM CABRAL, 2011). 
Because of its rapid economic development until 2014, Brazil held the 
capacity – and partly applied it – to advance large-scale, strategic projects in South 
America, for example transport infrastructure built by Andrade Gutierrez or 
Odebrecht. Brazilian construction companies received considerable subsidies 
from the BNDES for such projects. At least 35 percent of these credits had to be 
spent on inputs from Brazil. Mercosur’s structural cohesion fund FOCEM was 
another means through which Brazil supported infrastructure projects in South 
America, at least in economically better times (PINHEIRO and GAIO, 2014). 
However, in addition to the aforementioned shortcomings of IIRSA’s projects, not 
everything financed by the BNDES contributes to regional integration: for example, 
Odebrecht benefited from such credits provided for the expansion of the subway 
network of Caracas. 
Counter intuitively, the involvement of Brazilian firms abroad has 
increased in the course of the last years. This does not apply to all Brazilian 
companies, but there appear to be many that rely on foreign markets – in Europe, 
the Far East, and the Americas – because these offer better prospects than Brazil’s 
stagnating domestic market (O GLOBO, 2018a). This form of internationalization of 
Brazilian firms, which does give a boost to their presence in the neighboring 
countries, is market-seeking, however. Instead of establishing value chains that 
would tie the South American economies together, Brazilian investors have set up 
subsidiaries that source, produce and sell in separate national markets. A study by 
the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2006) 
makes the same point: Brazilian enterprises have established branch plant 
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operations throughout the region so as to circumvent market access restrictions 
(or, in less frequent cases, to access resources for consumption in Brazil). 
Efficiency and strategic asset seeking, which would result in sophisticated regional 
value chains, remain marginal. 
Brazil increasingly participates in global value chains as an exporter of 
primary-sector goods, rather than fostering regional value chains that would drive 
industrialization. According to figures provided by Viola and Lima (2017), 
manufacturing accounts for not much more than 10 percent of the Brazilian GDP 
(down from 16 to 18 per cent in the second half of the 2000s) and slightly less than 
40 percent of all exports (down from a peak of almost 60 percent at the beginning 
of this century). The two authors furthermore point out that Brazil is a closed 
economy – measured by the share of exports in GDP and the share of foreign value-
added in gross exports. The latter stands at 11 percent, as compared to a 
global average of 24 percent. 
Brazil does serve as a considerable supplier to the region, which 
becomes apparent in trade in automobiles and electronics – more than half 
of Brazil’s corresponding exports go to South America (KAMIYA, 2014)3. 
Because of its closed economy, Brazil is not, however, a major importer in the 
regional context. Production inputs are domestic or from overseas (IAPADRE 
AND TAJOLI, 2014). Chen and De Lombaerde (2014) also find that Brazil has 
increased its exports to the region but not its imports therefrom. Regional value 
chains as a driver of industrialization should follow a reverse pattern, 
with the geoeconomic node being fed by production inputs – that is, intermediary 
goods – from the region, further processing and then exporting them globally. 
Such a hub – linked to the spokes via backward linkages – would be 
necessary for South America to copy the Far Eastern model of development 
through regional value chains, which is based on intensive trade in manufactured 
intermediary goods. Chen and De Lombaerde (2011), among others, argue that 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
3As a side note, these exports are manufactured by foreign affiliates established in Brazil to assess 
the South American markets, suggesting that Brazil serves as a gateway to the region in some 
value chains. 
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Brazil is at least a candidate in this regard, possibly serving as a dual hub together 
with Argentina. Such a vision is, however, still far from reality. 
The regional activities of Petrobras exemplify these limits to Brazil’s 
role as a geoeconomic node. Petrobras is the major buyer of natural gas from 
Bolivia. This is pure resource-seeking investment. Before Brazil’s current crisis, the 
partly state-owned giant realized the main share of its international oil production 
in South America: 75 out of 148 million barrels a day in 2013; up from 19 out of 53 
million in 2000 but down from a peak of 123 out of 144 million in 2006. 
Petrobras’s exploitation of natural gas, which is almost exclusively South America, 
increased from 1.7 million cubic meters (cbm) a day in 2000 to 15.1 million in 
2013 (Petrobras, 2013b). Since 2014, Petrobras has disinvested from 
Argentina, Colombia, and Peru. This is not only the result of the financial crisis of 
the Brazilian giant. As a former executive of Petrobras Argentina explained in a 
personal conversation with us, the company had earlier decided to 
concentrate on the Brazilian pre-salt resources – a decision whose magnitude 
was reinforced by the corruption scandal, which practically cut Petrobras off from 
international credit markets. Petrobras hence sold its assets abroad in order to be 
able to invest in Brazil4. 
Further to that, Brazil’s role as a geoeconomic node must be spatially 
delineated in a precise way. The literature on Brazil as an anchor country, leading 
area and regional powers refers to South America, as do Brazil’s official foreign 
policy documents, so we follow suit.  As Figure 01 and 02 show, Brazil is 
an important trading partner of the countries of the Southern Cone, with the 
exception of Chile. In particular Argentina and Paraguay trade intensively with 
Brazil; so does Bolivia with regard to its exports. The ongoing crisis appears to 
have only affected Argentinean and Bolivian exports to Brazil,  but some 
caution is needed because the absolute foreign trade of several regional 
countries fluctuates considerably, complicating the interpretation of relative 
figures. Table 01 reveals that Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, and Venezuela 
are economically much closer to the US. China is the most important trading 
partner of Chile and Peru5. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
4Personal conversation with a former executive of Petrobras Argentina, Buenos Aires, 10 June 
2016. 
5The literature that applies the gravity model to intraregional trade, especially Bown et al. (2017), 
contradicts this interpretation because trade among the South American countries is slightly more than 
the model predicts. What matters to this article however is that our benchmark – the concepts of anchor 
countries, leading areas, and regional powers – leads to different expectations. Revisiting these concepts 
against the backdrop of the gravity model is an interesting endeavor for a different article. 
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Table 01. Share of China and the US in the foreign trade of the regional countries 
 Share of China in 
total exports 
Share of China in 
total imports 
Share of the US in 
total exports 
Share of the US in 
total imports 
Argentina 7.5% 18.5% 7.9% 11.3% 
Bolivia 5.1% 21.7% 7.8% 8.4% 
Chile 27.5% 23.9% 14.5% 18.1% 
Colombia 5.1% 19.3% 28.5% 26.3% 
Ecuador 4.0% 15.4% 31.5% 22.8% 
Guyana marginal 8.9% 16.5% 26.5% 
Paraguay marginal 31.3% marginal 7.4% 
Peru 26.5% 22.3% 15.2% 20.1% 
Suriname marginal 7.6% marginal 30.6% 
Uruguay 19.0% 20.0% 5.7% 10.9% 
Venezuela 16.0% 14.2% 34.8% 24.8% 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2018). 
Note: Data is for 2017. 
 
Figure 01. Share of exports to Brazil in the total exports of the regional countries 
 
Source: IADB (2018). 
Notes: Since rounded values are shown, 0 percent means that the respective share is 
smaller than 0.5 percent. Guyana has been excluded for better visualization. Brazil reached a share 
of 0.4 percent in Guyana’s exports in 2017. Data on Suriname is incomplete, but Brazil’s 
share in Suriname’s exports stood at 0.2 and 0.7 percent in 2014 and 2015 respectively. The 
IADB’s data on Venezuela’s foreign trade does not specify the shares of single countries therein.  
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 03 shows that as a source of foreign direct investment, Brazil 
plays a considerable role for Paraguay and Uruguay. Whereas its relevance 
for Paraguay increased tremendously from 2010 until 2017, Brazil lost its 
dominance as a source of FDI for Uruguay during the same time frame.  
Brazilian FDI plays a marginal role in Argentina. It has lost much relevance in 
Peru and gained some in Venezuela, probably because there are few companies 
that would invest in the latter country at the moment. For the remaining regional 
countries, Brazilian FDI is irrelevant. 
 
Figure 02. Share of imports from Brazil in the total imports of the regional countries 
 
 
Source: IADB (2018). 
Notes: Brazil reached a share of 1.5 percent in Guyana’s imports in 2017. Brazil’s share in 
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Figure 03. Brazil’s share of the inward FDI stock of the regional countries 
 
 
Source: Banco do Brasil (n.d.) and UN Conference on Trade and Development (2018). 
Note: Data is insufficient for Guyana and Suriname. 
 
Providing another indicator of the low level of regional integration, 
exports to South America account for a very low share of the GDP of most South 
American countries, as Figure 04 shows. Bolivia and Paraguay are exceptions 
because of the former’s exports of natural gas and the latter’s exports of 
agricultural goods to Argentina and Brazil. The share of regional exports 
in GDP for both countries has dropped remarkably during the last decade. For all 
other countries, the relevance of regional exports has declined from a low level in 
the late 2000s to a very low level today. With regard to geoeconomic nodality, it is 
particularly revealing that Brazil’s regional exports equaled only two percent of 
GDP in recent years. It may be true that Brazil’s exports to South America are 
marked by a very high share of manufactured products, which Pinheiro and 
Gaio (2014) see as an indication of a potential to foster industrialization in 
Brazil through intraregional trade. This potential however refers to a negligible 
share of Brazil’s total economy. 
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Figure 04. Share of regional exports in the GDP of the regional countries 
 
 
Source: IADB (2018) and World Bank (2018).  
Notes: Guyana’s regional exports amounted to between 0.1 percent of GDP (2009, minimum) and 
5.2 percent (2014, maximum). Those of Suriname declined from 2.5 percent (2014, maximum) to 
0.1 percent (2017, minimum).  
 
 
Location and physical barriers 
At first glance, Brazil benefits from a central location in South America. The 
geographical center of the continent is located at 15° Southern latitude and 55° 
Western longitude, close to Cuiabá. Brazil borders with all regional countries, with 
the exceptions of Chile and Ecuador. Because of this centrality, trade is not 
hampered by numerous border stops – the few existing ones do cause serious 
delays (more on this later) – and there are almost no transit countries that 
could interfere.  
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Still, Brazil is a huge country, as the size comparison with Portugal on the 
maps below shows. Recife is closer to Monrovia in Liberia (air distance: 3,100 
kilometers) than to Quito in Ecuador (4,900 kilometers). Brazil’s core zone of 
population and economic activity – the federal states of Rio de Janeiro and São 
Paulo – is far away from the Andean countries, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela. 
Road distance from São Paulo to Lima is almost 5,000 kilometers. A 
rather theoretical road trip from São Paulo to Caracas would mean traveling 
more than 6,000 kilometers. Even Buenos Aires is 2,250 kilometers  away 
from the Brazilian metropolis. As Map 01 shows, Brazil ’s population and 
economic activity is concentrated in proximity to the coast.  About 80 
percent of the population live less than 200 kilometers away from the 
Atlantic Ocean6. Agglomerations in the hinterland such as Brasília and Manaus 
are exceptions. Since maritime transport is not hampered by physical barriers, it is 
plausible to expect that economic activity in close proximity to the Brazilian coast 
rather generates maritime than continental links. 
Indeed, 48 to 53 percent of Brazil’s trade with South America was 
transported by ocean-bound ships between the mid-2000s and 2017 (up from 37 
to 40 percent in the late 1990s) if measured by monetary value; if measured by 
weight, this figure increases to 63 to 69 percent (up from about 55 percent in the 
late 1990s), with a drop to 55 to 60 percent in the first half of the 2010s7. With 
regard to maritime transport, distance is likely to have a negative impact 
on regional ties. The main ports of Brazil (Santos) and Peru (Callao) are 
almost 4,800 nautical miles apart, more than Santos and the harbor of Miami 
in the US. Guayaquil – the most important harbor of Ecuador – is further 
away from Santos than Le Havre in France. The only South American urban 
agglomerations that are closer to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo than to potential 
non-South American trading partners are Buenos Aires and Montevideo. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
6Percentages calculated based on data retrieved from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics ˂http://www.ibge.gov.br/apps/snig/v1/?loc=0˃. 
7Percentages calculated based on data retrieved from Comex Stat ˂http://comexstat.mdic.gov.br/pt/home .˃ 
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These locational disadvantages are reinforced by physical barriers, 
which are depicted by Map 02. South America consists of three major 
physio-geographical regions: the Andes, the highlands of Brazil and Guiana, 
and lowlands that stretch from the Amazon basin to the Paraguay–Paraná 
basin to the Patagonian plateau. Along the Amazon River and its tributaries, 
annual floods hamper transport. They make rivers rise by up to nine meters. 
Many jetties there cannot be used all year long. Bridges are frequently 
washed away. Although the Amazon River is navigable from its mouth to Iquitos 
in Peru (a distance of more than 1,200 kilometers), river transport is risky because 
of shifting sandbanks. The hot and wet tropical climate accounts for a 
dense, almost insurmountable vegetation. Transport corridors built through the 
rainforest are rapidly overgrown by vegetation. Heavy rains amount to 2,500 
millimeters a year. They make earth and gravel roads impassable and cause 
significant damage to more robust infrastructure. 
To the southeast of the Amazon basin, there is a plateau landscape at 300 to 
500 meters above the sea level: the Brazilian highlands. It is broken up by low 
mountain systems and deep valleys. The terrain becomes very rough in the federal 
state of Goiás. Railroads and roads frequently traverse many kilometers to reach 
destinations only short linear distances apart. For example, in the 1980s, a journey 
from Rio de Janeiro to Belo Horizonte took an hour by airplane but 14 by rail. Air 
distance between the two cities is 340 kilometers; the railroad tracks 
extended 640. The scheduled passenger service between Rio de Janeiro and Belo 
Horizonte was discontinued in 1990. Given that the Brazilian highlands are 
tilted north- and westward, rivers rising near their east rim, practically at 
sight of the Atlantic Ocean, flow inland for hundreds of kilometers before veering 
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Map 01. Population density in South America
 
 
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on data obtained from several national statistical offices. 
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Map 02. Physical barriers in South America
 
 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
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In the east, the Brazilian highlands ascend steep escarpments, which link 
up with the coast. There are only two places where they rise in a single slope and 
thus somewhat ease movement from the coast to the hinterland: between 
Paranaguá and Curitiba, and between Santos and São Paulo. Those who have 
traveled from Santos to São Paulo by road will admit that even this well-developed 
route appears quite adventuresome. The Rodovia dos Imigrantes, inaugurated in 
1974, contains 07 bridges, 11 tunnels, and 44 viaducts. Along with the older 
Rodovia Anchieta, which also connects Santos to São Paulo, it is considered a 
masterpiece of civil engineering. In other words, connecting the coastal strip to the 
hinterland is difficult and expensive. The lack of railroads drives up the cost of 
transport (WORLD BANK, 2012); so does the fact that there are few alternative 
ports to Paranaguá and Santos. As a consequence, the queue of trucks waiting to 
enter Santos sometimes stretches to 40 kilometers, as reported by The Economist 
(2013). 
Further south, the Paraguay–Paraná basin and the Patagonian plateau 
offer a relative ease of movement that facilitates economic interaction. The river 
network of the former has been a key axis of expansion into the interior of the 
continent since colonial times (BROWN, 1979). The Andes, meanwhile, constitute 
the utmost barrier. They are relatively wide in their central and north reaches (up 
to 700 kilometers from east to west), and contain several north-to-south ridges as 
well as extensive plateaus and valleys. The ridges block cross-continental 
movement of people and goods. The plateaus and valleys host isolated cities such 
as Bogotá and La Paz. By average, the Southern Andes are lower. Valleys are 
narrower. The east-to-west extension is about 200 kilometers. Even the Southern 
Andes are a tremendous obstacle to transport. The route to the main crossover 
between Argentina and Chile is a slow, gentle incline on the Argentinean side. 
On the Chilean side, the slope has a far higher grade so that the road consists of a 
long series of switchbacks to make the descent. Sometimes the path must be closed 
in winter, when snow blocks its ends and the threat of rockfall is considerable. 
 
Transcontinental infrastructure 
At the beginning of this century, a report by the IADB (2000) showed that 
trade in South America remained low because of insufficient transport 
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infrastructure. According to an ECLAC study published three years later (SÁNCHEZ 
and TOMASSIAN, 2003), inefficiencies in the transport sector accounted for an 
extra cost of US$ 170 per truck going from Argentina to Brazil, or vice versa. Using 
routes other than the main arteries added up to 40 percent to transport costs 
due to the poor quality of these roads. Border stops slowed down transport, taking 
30 to 36 hours for trucks going from Brazil to Argentina. Not much has improved 
as of today. The Economist (2018) recently reported that Latin America and the 
Caribbean suffer from massive infrastructure deficiencies. Private and public 
investment in infrastructure stands at 2.5 percent of GDP on average – about 
a third of the corresponding spending in the Asia–Pacific region. According to 
Perrotti and Sánchez (2011), an average investment of 6.2 percent of GDP a year is 
necessary between 2012 and 2020. 
Road density in South America is low, boosting the disadvantage 
that results from Brazil’s enormous territorial extension. There are 19 kilometers 
of road per 100 square kilometers of land in Brazil, 07 in Bolivia, 08 in Paraguay, 
and 10 in Peru. The corresponding value for the US, which contains vast 
sparsely populated areas like Brazil, is 67. Europe ’s largest economies reach 
values of about 180 (WORLD BANK, 2013). The paved road network, depicted by 
Map 03, is relatively dense in Brazil’s northeast, south and southeast, but it 
virtually vanishes west of a line from Belém to Campo Grande. West of a line from 
Manaus to Porto Velho, even sufficiently maintained earth and gravel roads 
become rare. Only two corridors, partly in miserable condition, cross the Andes: 
the Inter-Oceanic Highway goes from south Peru via Rio Branco and Cuiabá to 
southeast Brazil; the Pan-American Highway stretches from the Colombian–
Panamanian border via Quito and Lima to Santiago de Chile, where it splits into 
one branch that ends in Southern Chile, and another one that goes to Buenos Aires 
and from there along the Atlantic Coast to the southern edge of the continent8.  
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
8The term highway may be misleading for readers used to transport infrastructure in the Global 
North. In South America, so called highways outside major cities are paved (or unpaved) two-lane 
roads, whose condition ranges from sufficient to miserable. 
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Map 03. Road infrastructure in South America
 
 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
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Transport by rail is even more difficult because railroad gauges vary. The 
reason for this is that railroads were initially built for bringing primary-sector 
goods to the coast. They were not meant to serve as a means of transnational or 
even transcontinental transport. In the La Plata region, tracks were built with 
different gauges from the mid-nineteenth century onward so that they could not be 
used by invading armies. Even the few existing railroad corridors do not allow for 
efficient transport. The one from Buenos Aires to São Paulo is 300 kilometers 
longer than the route by road and contains different gauges. The tracks on the 
Brazilian side date back to the early twentieth century. On the Argentinean side, 
there is only one bridge across the Paraná River. About a decade ago, transport 
from Buenos Aires to São Paulo by rail took twice as long as transport by road 
(LACERDA, 2009). Since then, nothing has changed, as best demonstrated by the 
failure of Brazil’s concession system to attract any investor for building new 
railroads or rehabilitating existing ones (QUINTELLA, 2016). 
China’s interest in South American markets has induced a need to better 
connect to the Pacific Ocean. The People’s Republic has announced its support for a 
yet-to-be-rehabilitated railroad corridor from Chilean and Peruvian ports to  
Southern Brazil – the Twin Ocean Railroad. The most likely route runs 
through Bolivia. An alternative corridor passes through Argentina and 
Paraguay. Considerable financial support has been promised by China (PORTAL 
PORTUARIO, 2016a, 2016b), but few details have been disclosed and feasibility 
studies have not been carried out yet (PORTAL PORTUARIO, 2018b). What matters 
to our analysis is that Chinese-built corridors remain a vision – just like the 
offer of the Spanish government to finance the Twin Ocean Railroad and a similar 
proposal by a German–Swiss consortium of private enterprises (PORTAL 
PORTUARIO, 2018a, 2018c). 
The South American ministers responsible for energy, telecommunication, 
and transport had already agreed in 2000 to coordinate their policies and to foster 
physical integration9. They identified twelve transcontinental development axes 
and founded IIRSA as a loose intergovernmental initiative, a technical 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
9We speak of physical integration – instead of regional integration – so as to stress that these efforts 
are limited to building transport infrastructure. 
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forum for cooperation on regional infrastructure that is meant to 
concentrate on coordinating investment in projects that physically interlink the 
South American countries. By 2017, the IIRSA portfolio reached US$ 199 billion 
and a total of 562 projects, including 153 fully implemented projects for US$ 48 
billion. The development axes Mercosur–Chile and Peru–Brazil–Bolivia are by far 
the largest with a respective investment share of 24 and 17 percent (COSIPLAN, 
2017). 
In addition to the aforementioned dominance of single-country projects, 
the IADB (2008) criticizes that IIRSA has not contributed to lowering regulatory 
hurdles to cross-border interaction. Political decision makers have remained 
largely absent from the initiative. In spite of IIRSA’s mandate, new financing 
instruments suited to the particularities of integration projects have not been 
developed. Financing and implementation remain responsibilities of the member 
state that hosts the respective infrastructure. States that face severe budget 
constraints (such as Argentina and Brazil at present) or are close to collapse (like 
Venezuela) cannot maintain the commitments they have made under better 
economic conditions. 
What is more, Palestini and Agostinis (2015) observe that Brazil’s initial 
commitment to the rehabilitation of transport infrastructure in South America 
reflected the efforts of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso presidency to physically 
integrate the entire Brazilian territory in the context of the Avança Brasil agenda. 
Putting corresponding projects in a continental instead of national frame eased 
access to financial support from organizations such as ECLAC and the IADB. In 
other words, the national focus of IIRSA perfectly matches Brazilian interests, 
which have little to do with regional integration. 
One may suggest that trade in services constitutes an alternative to trade 
in goods for South America – not only because trade in services is not hampered by 
insufficient rail and road networks, but also because more and more services have 
become tradable, offering considerable opportunities for emerging economies to 
provide them to their respective regions, as Turok and Visagie (2019) explain with 
regard to South Africa. Viola and Lima (2017) consider services exports an 
opportunity for value chains in Mercosur because they are marked by high value-
added content. Unfortunately, besides that fact that Brazil’s share in world services 
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trade is marginal, the Brazilian services sector suffers from poor quality and high 
costs (Arbache, 2016). 
Comparing visions and reality of regional cooperation on energy confirms 
that integration – and thus Brazil’s geoeconomic nodality – is mostly rhetoric, 
except for a few successful projects such as the Itaipú hydroelectric dam. Two 
years after the Gasoducto del Sur – a giant network of natural gas pipelines 
across the continent – had first been promoted by Hugo Chávez, Petrobras ’s 
president, José Sergio Gabrielli, said it would take 25 to 30 years for a project of 
this dimension to become operational. The Gasoducto del Sur was later shelved 
because of Brazil’s massive domestic pre-salt discoveries. Brazil’s pipeline network 
has only recently been interconnected nationwide. The focus lies on the 
exploitation of untapped resources in the Amazon Basin and Atlantic Ocean, not 
on intraregional trade (ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 2013). The 
Bolivia–Brazil pipeline GASBOL connects Santa Cruz with Porto Alegre and São 
Paulo, reaching a capacity of 31.1 million cbm a day (ENERGY INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION, 2012). Other than that, there are only minor cross-border 
pipelines, which link Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay, as well as Colombia 
and Venezuela. 
With regard to trade in electricity, the potential of further integration looks 
equally dim. Experts of the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE, 2003) 
argued at the beginning of this century that Argentina and Brazil possess a realistic 
transfer potential of 5,000 megawatts, which equals only 3.3 percent of Brazil’s 
installed capacity. Argentina and Chile were expected to reach transfers of not 
more than 500 megawatts; so were Brazil and Uruguay. Colombia and 
Ecuador as well as Ecuador and Peru, were predicted to transfer 250 
megawatts bilaterally10. In more recent publications, OLADE (2013, 2012) 
develops scenarios of regional cooperation and highlights according 
benefits, but these documents fall short of indicating steps already taken or 
likely to be taken so as to realize these wishful aspirations. As Scholvin and Betz 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
10These calculations exclude the output of bi- and multinational hydropower stations. 
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(2019) summarize, various bi- and multilateral hydropower stations have 




At least until the impeachment of President Rousseff, Brazil supported the 
expansion of domestic enterprises into the neighboring countries. The BNDES 
played the key role in this regard. When Lula came into office, development-
oriented economists affiliated with the Workers’ Party (PT) took the lead of the 
bank. The BNDES more than doubled its investment portfolio (SANTANA, 
2011). It sought to strengthen Brazilian enterprises; first of all by 
supporting the concentration of capital in the hands of a few, creating ‘sectoral 
champions’ that were supposed to be internationally competitive (COUTO, 2008). 
Zibechi (2012) argues that South America – especially Bolivia, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay – were transformed into economies subordinated to Brazil, into stepping 
stones for the globalization of these sectoral champions. 
Another key means of the BNDES to boost the regional standing of 
Brazilian companies is the scheme ‘BNDES Finem’ (BNDES, 2013a). This 
scheme consists of credit lines directed at specific sectors, including energy and 
transport. Credits for projects carried out abroad by Brazilian enterprises, 
covering up to 60 percent of the total costs, are granted under the condition that 
the respective projects contribute to the economic and social development of 
Brazil. Since 2003, the BNDES has also participated in projects abroad as 
a shareholder. Brazilian exports are eased by the scheme ‘BNDES Exim ’ 
(BNDES, 2013b). The BNDES has given Brazilian exporters proceeds for 
high value-added industrial sales in Latin America up front since 2011. 
The bank has also provided open credit lines to states that are certain to 
spend these credits on Brazilian products. Argentina, for example, received credits 
of US$ 1.2 billion from 2005 to 2009, which then went into the pockets of 
Brazilian construction firms (HOCHSTETLER and MONTERO, 2013). There is 
not a preference for regional over global expansion, however. The BNDES 
serves as an agency of the globalization of Brazilian enterprises, not of regional 
integration (RAMSEY and ALMEIDA, 2010). 
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The bank’s role now appears to be in a process of redefinition. The BNDES 
has not only become involved in criminal proceedings related to corruption 
scandals. Its monetary capacities have also declined significantly because it was 
ordered to pay back loans to the state during Michel Temer’s presidency. Due to 
new policies, credits provided by the BNDES are now more expensive than private 
sector credits (TEIXEIRA, 2018). Bolsonaro initially appointed Joaquim Levy as 
president of the BNDES and Paulo Guedes as minister of the economy. Guedes and 
Levy are Chicago-trained neoliberal economists, opposed to the proactive 
economic and developmental policies that marked the BNDES in the era of the PT 
presidencies. It hence appears highly unlikely that the BNDES will continue to 
promote integration in South America. 
Even before the impeachment of President Rousseff, regional integration 
advanced much more slowly than envisaged. The BNDES published studies 
on monetary integration of Argentina and Brazil at the beginning of 
this century (Giambiagi, 2001). No progress has been made since then. The 
topic has simply vanished from the debate. A major obstacle to Brazilian 
investment in South America is double taxation – that is, the levying of a tax by two 
jurisdictions on the same asset, financial transaction, or income. Argentina, Chile, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela have signed agreements with Brazil to avoid double 
taxation. No such agreements exist between Brazil, on the one side, and Bolivia, 
Colombia, Guyana, Paraguay, Suriname, and Uruguay, on the other. Mercosur has 
also failed to lower tariffs on intermediary goods. These have increased 
since the early 2000s (VIOLA and LIMA, 2017). Regulatory standards and rules of 
origin are further challenges in the regional community (INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, 2017). 
Brazilian investment in its neighboring countries is additionally hampered 
by insecure currency exchange rates. Between 2008 and 2013, the exchange rate of 
the Brazilian Real to the Argentinian Peso fluctuated between 1:1.39 and 
1:2.66. At the time of this writing, it stood at 1:11.40. One Brazilian Real was 
worth 0.89 Venezuelan Bolívares in January 2009 but 3.19 in February 2013. 
Today, Venezuela suffers from hyperinflation11. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
11The exchange rates have been calculated online at: ˂www.x-rates.com˃. 
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What is more, some regional states pursue policies that are 
counterproductive to regional cooperation. In 2010, 68 percent of Bolivia ’s 
natural gas output, representing 80 percent of its natural gas exports, went to 
Brazil (ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 2012). The Bolivian 
government then forced Petrobras to renegotiate its long-term contract in the 
course of the re-nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector, making the Brazilians 
pay higher royalties. Given the apparent insecurity involved in trade 
with Bolivia, a pre-crisis business plan by Petrobras (2011) specifies that 
imports of Bolivian natural gas will remain constant at 30 million cbm a day until 
2020. Conventional production in Brazil is to increase from 55 to 102 million 
cbm, which does not cover pre-salt sources, whose share in domestic 
production is to increase from 07 to 31 percent (PETROBRAS, 2013a). 
If there were no political uncertainties, Brazil would purchase energy 
resources in Bolivia, Venezuela, and probably also Argentina instead of developing 
its own. Argentina used to be an even less secure provider than Bolivia, as 
demonstrated by the decision of Nestor Kirchner ’s government to abruptly 
limit exports of natural gas to Chile in 2004, breaking previously signed 
contracts. The insecurity of natural gas imports experienced by Brazil and Chile is 
due to the general political orientation of Argentina (until the 2015 election) and 
Bolivia, whose governments have strongly interfered with the economy. Brazil’s PT 
also adhered to state interventionism, albeit to lesser extent than practiced 
Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela. We cannot enter into a debate on neoliberal 
versus state-driven development here, but the previous lines suggest that certain 
forms of state interventionism, arguably carried out for the sake of national 
development, work against Brazil’s geoeconomic nodality. 
 
Conclusion 
This article dealt with Brazil ’s role in South America, which we 
analyzed in the light of the concept of geoeconomic nodality. This 
perspective advances the state of research because it shows whether 
rhetoric on regional cooperation and integration translates into reality. Our 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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approach is also innovative insofar as it draws attention to neglected causal 
factors: geographical conditions that interact with public policies. We contend that 
such causal factors are an important piece of the puzzle that is Brazil ’s role 
in South America. 
The distinctiveness of our approach becomes particularly clear 
when compared to Milani, Pinheiro and Lima ’s (2017) insightful article. 
They find that cohesion among domestic elites has often been insufficient for Brazil 
to become a regional leader or paymaster, a graduated power in their terminology. 
In contrast, our analysis demonstrated that there are structural constraints to 
Brazil’s graduation or regional hegemony – if one considers connectivity and 
influence in the economic sphere as vital elements of hegemony. We argue, 
therefore, that Brazil’s ‘graduation dilemma’ also rests on structure – that is, 
geoeconomic nodality – and not merely on agency. 
Brazil’s interaction with its region is much less expressive than 
what one expects from an anchor country, leading area, or regional power. 
Certainly, the internationalization of Brazilian firms appears to be concentrated on 
South America. Brazilian construction companies have been involved in important 
infrastructure projects, benefiting from financial support granted by the BNDES. 
Still, Brazilian investment in the region is market and resource-seeking. Except for 
a few cases such as Argentina’s automotive sector, it hardly generates value chains, 
which could trigger development in the neighboring countries. While Brazil is an 
important trading partner of the Southern Cone (except for Chile), trade with the 
Andean and Caribbean countries is very limited. Brazil’s role as a source of FDI 
remains negligible, with the exception of Paraguay and Uruguay. Regional exports 
account for a very low share of the regional GDP. Therefore, we would not even 
claim that Brazil is the geoeconomic node of the Southern Cone, albeit its relevance 
there is higher than in South America as a whole. 
The concept of geoeconomic nodality rests on four factors (location and 
physical barriers, the distribution of the population and economic activity,  
infrastructure for energy and transport, and public policies). First, 
distances in South America are tremendous. Two major physical barriers, 
the Andean Mountain Range and the Amazon Rainforest, separate Brazil 
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from many of its neighbors. The Brazilian highlands and the landscape 
configuration of the coast implies that the Brazilian economy is marked by a 
maritime orientation. Second, the Brazilian population concentrates close to the 
Atlantic Ocean, compounding the impact of large distances to the neighboring 
countries. Third, although transport corridors could help to overcome physical 
barriers, South America suffers from a lack of railroads and roads that bind the 
regional countries together. IIRSA serves as a means to advance projects of 
national scope rather than fostering physical integration across borders. Energy-
related infrastructure does not allow for close cross-border ties either. Fourth, 
public policies interact with natural and man-made geography. This includes the 
support schemes by the BNDES for Brazil’s regional expansion – introduced 
during the Cardoso presidency, expanded in the PT era and now largely 
discontinued. Resource nationalism, double taxation, and fluctuating exchange 
rates work against Brazilian–South American interaction. 
We admit that assessments of regional integration in South America – or, 
more generally, in the Global South – must avoid Euro-centric biases. Because of 
the different trajectory of economic relations, and the smaller and less developed 
markets in the Global South, such a comparison would miss the point. Even 
prosperous emerging economies, such as Brazil until 2014, lack the financial 
means that initially allowed Germany and France to drive European 
integration as paymasters (MATTLI, 1999). At this stage, regional integration 
beyond Europe and North America should focus on developing physical conditions 
– in particular infrastructure for energy and transport – that improve connectivity 
and foster regional interdependence. Our analysis demonstrated that there are 
major obstacles in this regard in South America. Yet, considering budgets 
constraints due to recurrent economic crises and chronic political instability, as 
well as the re-orientation of Brazil’s economic and foreign policies under 
Bolsonaro, it is unlikely that regional economic integration will receive any 
meaningful boost in the coming years. 
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